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Introduction
Did 1974 mark the beginning of a third indus-
trial revolution—an era of rapid technological
progress associated with the development of
information technologies? Did the quickened
pace of technological advance lead to greater
income inequality? Is a productivity slowdown
related to these phenomena?
The story told here connects the rate of tech-
nological progress with the level of income
inequality and productivity growth. Imagine that
a leap in the state of technology occurs and is
embodied in new machines, such as those used
in information technologies (IT). Now suppose
that adopting these technologies involves a sig-
nificant cost in terms of learning, and that
skilled workers have an advantage at learning.
Then the advance in technology will be associ-
ated with an increased demand for the skills
needed to implement them. Hence, the wages
of skilled labor relative to unskilled labor (the
skill premium) will rise, and income inequality
will increase. In their early phases, new tech-
nologies may not operate efficiently due to
inexperience. The initial incarnation of ideas
into equipment may be far from ideal. Produc-
tivity growth may seem to stall as the economy
makes the (unmeasured) investment in knowl-
edge needed if the new technologies are to
approach their full potential. The coincidence of
rapid technological progress, widening wage
inequality, and a slowdown in productivity
growth has precedents in economic history.
I. The Information Age
Figure 1 shows the price of a piece of new pro-
ducer equipment relative to the price of a unit
of nondurable consumer goods or services over
the period following World War II. The marked
drop in the relative price of producer equip-
ment is a reflection of the high rate of techno-
logical progress in the producer-durables sec-
tor. Specifically, technological progress enables
ever-larger quantities of investment goods to be
produced with a given amount of labor and
capital, a process that drives down the prices of
such goods. This type of advance is dubbed
investment-specific technological progress
because it affects the investment-goods sector
of the economy.
The price of equipment fell faster after 1974
than before, as the slope of the trend line
shows. If the decline in new equipment prices
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can be taken as a measure of improved effi-
ciency in production, then the pace of techno-
logical advance jumped up around 1974. Some
economists estimate that 60 percent of postwar
U.S. growth may derive from the introduction
of new, more efficient equipment.1  The rapid
advance in technology since 1974 is undoubt-
edly linked to IT development. The price of a
new computer has plummeted over the post-
war period at an average rate of about 19 per-
cent annually (see figure 2).2  Hence, a new
computer costing $5,000 in 1987 would have
been priced at $2 million in 1955. Figure 3 illus-
trates the phenomenal rise of IT investment as
a fraction of total equipment investment (less
than 7 percent in 1954 compared with 50 per-
cent now).
Growth in labor productivity stalled with the
rise in IT investment, as figure 3 also shows.
Labor productivity, which gauges the amount
of gross domestic product (GDP) created per
hour of work, is often taken as a measure of
how efficient labor is in the economy. The
more GDP each worker can produce, the better
off the economy is. Before 1974, labor produc-
tivity grew at about 2 percent annually; after
that year, at a paltry 0.8 percent. This change is
often termed the “productivity slowdown.” Isn’t
it paradoxical that at a time of massive techno-
logical advance resulting from the introduction
of information technologies and the like, the
advance in a worker’s productivity should stall?
By most accounts, wage inequality began to
increase around 1974 (figure 4 shows some
postwar measures of income inequality).3  The
n 1 Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1998) break down U.S. post-
war growth into its sources in terms of investment-specific and other forms
of technological progress.
n 2 Yorukoglu (1998).
n 3 The data are from Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993, table 1.B).
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percentage gap between the average wage
earned by the upper quartile (above the
seventy-fifth percentile) and the average wage
earned by the lower quartile (the twenty-fifth
percentile and below) remained roughly con-
stant between 1959 and 1970. From 1970 to
1988, this gap increased 22 percentage points.
That is, the 53 percent gap in wage income that
existed between the two groups in 1970 had




The Industrial Revolution, which began in 1760,
epitomizes investment-specific technological
progress. This period witnessed the birth of sev-
eral technological miracles.4  Crompton’s mule
revolutionized the spinning of cotton. Next,
Watt’s energy-efficient engine brought steam
power to manufacturing. The main cost of a
steam engine was operating it: It was a hungry
beast. A Watt steam engine cost £500–800.5
Operating a steam engine, though, was enor-
mously expensive. Each consumed £3,000 of
coal per annum.6  By comparison, 500 horses,
which apparently could produce the same
amount of work, cost only £900 in feed. Thus,
the pursuit of an energy-efficient steam engine
was on. The older Newcomen steam engine of
1769 needed 30 pounds of coal per horsepower
hour, while a Watt engine of 1776 required 7.5
pounds. By 1850 or so, this number had been
reduced to 2.5. So the cost of steam power fell
dramatically over the course of the Industrial
Revolution. When the spinning mule was har-
nessed to steam power, the mechanization of
manufacturing was inexorable. By 1841, the real
price of spun cotton had fallen by two-thirds.
In 1784, Cort introduced his puddling and
rolling technique for making wrought iron, a
product vital for the industrialization of Britain.
Between 1788 and 1815, wrought iron produc-
tion increased 500 percent. Its price fell from
£22 to £14 per ton from 1801 to 1815, even
though the general price level rose 50 percent
between 1770 and 1815.
Last, the foundation of the modern machine-
tool industry was laid when Wilkinson designed
a gun-barreling machine that could make cylin-
ders for Watt’s steam engines, and Maudley
introduced the heavy-duty lathe.
Skill undoubtedly played an important role
in technological innovation and adoption. The
Industrial Revolution produced a handful of
miracles, but many historians also view it as an
age of continuous and gradual smaller innova-
tions—an age of learning. Implementing and
operating brilliant inventions and effecting the
subsequent innovations is often demanding,
skill-intensive work. It took three months, for
instance, for someone brought up in a mill to
learn how to operate either a hand mule or a
self-acting mule.7  Learning to maintain the for-
mer required three years, while the latter de-
manded seven. A worker continued to acquire
knowledge concerning improvements in the
machinery throughout his lifetime. It seems rea-
sonable to conjecture that the demand for skill
rose in the Industrial Revolution, since “for the
economy as a whole to switch from manual
techniques to a mechanized production re-
quired hundreds of inventors, thousands of
innovating entrepreneurs, and tens of thousands
of mechanics, technicians, and dexterous rank
and file workers.”8  Mokyr (1994) emphatically
rejects the notion that Britain’s more advanced
science accounted for the development of the
Industrial Revolution. He maintains that ideas
flowed from the Continent to Britain, and then
working technologies flowed back from Britain
to the Continent. He quotes an engineer of the
day, who observed that “the prevailing talent of
English and Scottish people was to apply new
ideas to use and to bring such applications to
perfection, but they do not imagine as much as
foreigners.” Mokyr concludes that “Britain’s
technological strength during the industrial rev-
olution depended above all on the abundance
and quality of its skilled mechanics and practical
technicians who could turn great insights into
productive applications.”9  In fact, income in-
equality rose throughout the Industrial Revolu-
tion (see figure 5).10
The diffusion of new technologies is often
slow because the initial incarnations of the
underlying ideas are inefficient. Getting new
technologies to operate at their full potential
n 4 This is chronicled in Mokyr (1994).
n 5 McPherson (1994, p. 16).
n 6 The classic source is Landes (1969, pp. 99–103), who quotes a
writer’s 1778 comment that “the vast consumption of fuel in these engines
is an immense drawback on the profits of our mines, for every fire-engine
of magnitude consumes £3,000 of coals per annum. This heavy tax
amounts almost to a prohibition.”
n 7 As reported by von Tunzelmann (1994).
n 8 Mokyr (1994, p. 29).
n 9 Ibid., p. 39
n 10 This is documented in Lindert and Williamson (1983, table 3).
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may take considerable time, so their productiv-
ity may be low at first. Cort’s famous puddling
and rolling process had a long incubation
period and was commercially unsuccessful at
first.11 Royalties had to be slashed to encourage
adoption. Apparently, “both entrepreneurs and
workers had to go through a learning period,
making many mistakes that often resulted in
low outputs of uneven quality.12  Productivity
growth fell in the initial stages of the Industrial
Revolution (see figure 5).13  Before the coming
of the new era, productivity was growing at 
0.4 percent a year; once it began, productivity
growth fell to an annual rate of 0.2 percent.
Was this decline, which lasted 40 years, con-
nected to the teething pains of adopting new
technologies? As the revolution spread, produc-
tivity growth picked up; 70 years in, it was
growing at a much more robust 0.5 percent.
Thus, the fruits of the Industrial Revolution
took time to ripen.
III. The American
Antebellum Period
The Industrial Revolution spread to the United
States around 1840, a time of tremendous
investment-specific technological progress. The
nation industrialized at a rapid clip. Figure 6
shows the dramatic decline in the price of new
equipment relative to all goods.14  Presumably,
this decrease reflects the improved efficiency of
new-equipment production, which allowed
more of it to be produced for less. One would
expect this decline in the price of new equip-
ment to encourage more investment. For the
period 1774–1815, the real stock of equipment
per capita grew at roughly 0.7 percent annually.
Between 1815 and 1860, however, the average
annual growth rate was a very robust 2.8 per-
cent, which jumped to a whopping 4.5 percent
from 1860 to 1900. Two examples illustrate the
extraordinary pace of industrialization. In 1830,
there were just 30 miles of railroad tracks in the
United States. By 1840, there were 2,808 miles,
while in 1860 the number was 30,000.15  Like-
wise, the aggregate capacity of U.S. steam en-
gines more than quadrupled between 1840 and
1860 (from 760,000 to 3,470,000 horsepower).
That capacity rose another one-and-a-half times
(to 5,590,000 horsepower) by 1870. The ante-
bellum period saw a dramatic surge in the skill
n 11 Again, as related by von Tunzelmann (1994).
n 12 C.K. Hyde, Technological Change and the British Iron Industry,
as cited by von Tunzelmann (1994, p. 277).
n 13 Calculated by Harley (1993, table 3.5).
n 14 This series is based on calculations using data presented in
Gallman (1992).
n 15 In 1840, roughly 30 percent of pig-iron production was devoted
to manufacturing tracks, and the railway used 30 percent of the country’s
steam-power capacity (McPherson [1994, chap. 3]).
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premium (see figure 6).16  Not surprisingly,
skilled workers such as engineers, machinists,
boilermakers, carpenters, and joiners, saw their
wages rise relative to those of common labor-
ers. Last, labor productivity growth slowed in
the 1840s just as the American Industrial Revo-
lution was gaining momentum; the annual
growth rate of labor productivity is plotted in
figure 6.17
IV. The Hypothesis
The adoption of new technologies involves a
significant cost in terms of learning; skill facili-
tates this learning process. That is, skill is
important for adapting to change. There is con-
siderable evidence of learning effects. For
example, using a 1973–86 data set consisting of
2,000 firms from 41 industries, Bahk and Gort
(1993) find that a plant’s productivity increases
15 percent over its first 14 years because of
learning effects.
There is also evidence that skill plays an
important role in facilitating the adoption of
new technologies. Farmers with high education
levels adopt agricultural innovations earlier
than farmers with low levels. Findings reported
in Bartel and Lichtenberg (1987) support the
joint hypothesis that 1) educated workers have
a comparative advantage in implementing new
technologies because they assimilate new ideas
more readily; and 2) the demand for educated
relative to less-educated workers declines as
experience with a technology is gained. For
each year equipment ages, skilled labor’s share
of the wage bill drops 0.78 percentage point.
This suggests that less skilled labor is needed as
production experience with equipment is
gained through time. Using a cross-country data
set, Flug and Hercowitz (1996) find that a rise
in equipment investment leads to an increase in
the skill premium and to higher relative em-
ployment for skilled labor. In particular, an
increase of 1 percentage point in the ratio of
equipment investment to output produces an
increase of 1.90 percentage points in the ratio
of skilled to unskilled employees. The infer-
ence drawn is that when investment in equip-
ment is high, so is the demand for skilled labor,
which eases the adoption process.
The hypothesis to be developed here is dif-
ferent from the capital–skill complementarity
hypothesis.18  The latter states that skilled labor
is more complementary with capital in produc-
tion than is unskilled labor or (more or less
equivalently) that capital substitutes better for
unskilled than for skilled labor. The recent rise
in the skill premium is consistent with capital–
skill complementarity and an increase in the
rate of investment-specific technological
advance.19  The idea in the current paper, how-
ever, is that successful adoption of a new tech-
nology requires skilled labor. Moreover, as a
technology becomes established, the produc-
tion process substitutes away from expensive
skilled labor toward less costly unskilled labor.
Therefore, times of heightened technological
progress should see an increase in the demand
for skilled labor, which has a comparative ad-
vantage in speeding up and easing the process
of technological adoption. Such times should
therefore be associated with a rise in the skill
premium. If this notion is correct, the skill pre-
mium should decline once the recent burst of
investment-specific technological progress sub-
sides as IT matures.20
How large are the costs of technological
adoption? Calculations suggest that the costs 
of adopting new technologies exceed inven-
tion costs by a factor of 20 to 1, and that adop-
tion costs may amount to 10 percent of GDP.21
Surely, the costs of technological adoption must
be large. How else to explain the long diffusion
lags for new technologies as well as the con-
tinual investment in older technologies at the
household, firm, and national levels? And, sure-
ly, a large part of these adoption costs must be
in acquiring or developing the skills needed to
implement the new technologies.
V. The Learning Curve
As an example of the importance of learning
effects, consider the Lawrence Number 2 Mill,
an antebellum cotton mill studied by David
(1975). The plant, built in 1834 in Lowell, Mass-
achusetts, kept detailed inventories of its equip-
n 16 These data are reported in Williamson and Lindert (1980,
appendix D).
n 17 The numbers are from Abramovitz and David (1973, table 2).
n 18 The hypothesis was originally advanced by Griliches (1969). 
A more recent formulation can be found in Krusell et al. (1996).
n 19 Krusell et al. (1996) make this case.
n 20 By contrast, this is not an implication of the capital–skill com-
plementarity hypothesis. Suppose that skilled labor is more complemen-
tary with equipment than is unskilled labor. Then, other things being equal,
the skill premium should rise as long as the stock of equipment increases.
That is, there should be a secular or long-run rise in the skill premium. For
more detail, see Krusell et al. (1996).
n 21 See Jovanovic (1997).
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ment showing that no new machinery was
added between 1836 and 1856. Thus, it seems
reasonable to infer that any productivity
increases that occurred in these years were due
purely to learning effects. In fact, the plant’s
output per hour of work during this period
grew 2.3 percent annually. Figure 7 shows the
plant’s learning curve. The four observations
pertain to years when the plant was known to
be operating at full capacity.
Learning curves from angioplasty surgery,
flight-control simulation, munitions manufactur-
ing, and steel finishing are documented in
Jovanovic and Nyarko (1995); the literature
abounds with additional examples. Yorukogolu
(1998) has used data from 297 firms during the
1987–91 period to study the learning curve for
information technologies. His results, plotted 
in figure 8, show strong learning effects. The
service flow (analogous to horsepower for a
steam engine) captured from new computers
increases dramatically over time, growing at
approximately 28 percent (compounded) annu-
ally. Two words of caution are offered here.
First, as the error bands show, the range of esti-
mates is quite wide because the data set per-
mits studying only a small number of firms for
a short period of time.22  Second, a firm uses
more than computers to produce output. If
computers account for 5 percent of output,
then this translates into an output growth rate
due to learning alone of about 1.4 percent 
(.28 3 .05 3 100 percent) a year.
Often, learning about a technology occurs
through use by the final purchaser. For some
products, such as software, important operating
characteristics are revealed only after intensive
use. The manufacturer may then adjust the
product in response to feedback from pur-
chasers, a process that may take many itera-
tions (Rosenberg [1982]). The aircraft industry
provides an excellent case of such learning by
using: As confidence about the operating char-
acteristics of the DC-8 airplane grew through
experience, the manufacturer increased the
engines’ thrust while reducing fuel consump-
tion, and modified the wings to decrease drag.
These modifications eventually allowed the air-
plane to be “stretched,” which more than dou-
bled its capacity from 123 seats to 251. The
result was a dramatic improvement in operating
costs, notably a 50 percent saving in fuel costs
per seat-mile. For complicated products, where
reliability is a major concern, maintenance
experience proves invaluable. In the case of
aircraft, maintenance may account for 30 per-
cent of the operating costs associated with
labor and materials (this excludes the revenue
lost during downtime). The costs of servicing
new types of jet engines fall dramatically after
their introduction. After a decade of operation,
maintenance costs typically have dropped to 
30 percent of their initial level.
n 22 The error bands show the 95 percent confidence intervals.
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VI. The Diffusion Curve
The adoption of new technologies is notori-
ously slow. The initial incarnations of new
ideas are often expensive and bug-infested.
The impact of investment-specific technological
progress on income and productivity is likely to
be regulated by two interrelated factors: the
speed of learning and the speed of diffusion.
The more costly it is for economic agents to
learn about a new technology, the slower the
technology’s diffusion. But the faster a new
technology diffuses through an economy, the
easier it may be to learn about it. Thus, there is
a feedback loop between the cost of adoption
and the extent of adoption. If a new technol-
ogy represents a radical or discrete departure
from past technologies, society’s knowledge
about it may be quite limited at first. As the
technology’s use becomes widespread, soci-
ety’s stock of experience with it increases, and
the technology’s productivity rises.
New technologies are expensive when they
are first produced, but prices drop as the manu-
facturer gains production experience. This
encourages adoption, which in turn fuels fur-
ther price declines when learning and scale
effects lower the costs of production. Waves of
imitators enter the industry, making pricing
more competitive. The odds of imitating a new
invention depend on the number of firms that
have already succeeded in adopting the new
invention. The number of firms increases with
time, making imitation easier. Firms also rush in
to produce complementary products, such as
software or communication devices for com-
puters. The original product may then have to
be modified to incorporate them better. Bring-
ing these complementary products on line may
take a lot of time and resources. The availability
of such products encourages further adoption,
and so on. An invention may take a long time
to bear fruit.
There is considerable evidence that the dif-
fusion of innovations is slow. In a classic
study, Gort and Klepper (1982) examined 46
product innovations, beginning with phono-
graph records in 1887 and ending with lasers
in 1960. They traced diffusion by examining
the number of firms producing the new prod-
uct over time. Only two or three firms on aver-
age were producing each new product for the
first 14 years after its commercial development;
then the number of firms increased sharply (by
an average of six firms per year over the next
10 years). Prices fell rapidly after a product’s
inception (down 13 percent annually for the
first 24 years). Using a 21-product subset of the
Gort and Klepper data, Jovanovic and Lach
(1996) find that the output of a new product
took approximately 15 years to rise from the
10 percent to the 90 percent diffusion level.
They also cite evidence from a study of 265
innovations that it took 41 years on average to
move from 10 percent to 90 percent diffusion.
Finally, it took the steam locomotive 54 years
to move from the 10 percent to the 90 percent
diffusion level in the U.S. and the diesel (a
lesser innovation) 12 years. The diffusion curve
for diesels (figure 9) shows that it took about
25 years after their introduction in 1925 for




The metamorphosis of a novel idea into a pro-
ductive technology can take a long time.23
Because a technology’s development is
uncharted at its infancy, a lot of time and
resources can go into exploring the various
paths that may be taken. Electricity and com-
puters are two interesting examples of this
uncertain process. Ironically, one of the Indus-
trial Revolution’s least productive inventions
formed the foundation of the current Informa-
tion Age. Sometime between 1823 and 1832,
F I G U R E 9
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n 23 The section title is borrowed from David (1991).
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 
Historical Statistics of the United States, 1790–1970.
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Charles Babbage created his “Difference
Engine,” a mechanical computer. The insight
for this device came partly from a binary-coded
loom, invented in 1801 by Jean-Marie Jacquard,
which used punch cards to control fabric pat-
terns. But as recently as 50 years ago, the com-
ing of the Information Age was still not obvi-
ous. Just after World War II, Popular Mechanics
(March 1949) wrote, “Where a calculator on the
ENIAC is equipped with 18,000 vacuum tubes
and weighs 30 tons, computers in the future




The electrification of America, masterfully
chronicled and analyzed by David (1991), illus-
trates the delays in successfully exploiting new
technologies. The era of electricity dawned
around 1900, in the midst of the Second Indus-
trial Revolution, which typically is considered
to have started in the 1860s and ended in the
1930s. It saw the birth of the modern chemical
industry and the internal combustion engine, in
addition to electricity. Electricity was obviously
useful as a source of lighting in homes and
businesses, but it had to supplant water and
steam as a source of power in manufacturing.24
This process was complicated by the large
stocks of equipment and structures, already in
place, that were geared to these power sources.
Thus, in the early stages, electricity tended to
be overlaid onto existing systems. In particular,
the mechanics of steam- and waterpower
favored having a single power unit drive a
group of machines, and early electric motors
retained the group-drive system of belts and
shafting that had been used by steam- and
waterpower. Hence, early electric motors were
also used to drive a group of machines. The
benefits of electricity derived from the savings
in power requirements and the greater control
over machine speed. Not surprisingly, electric
power tended to be used mostly by industries
that were expanding rapidly, since new plants
could be designed to accommodate this power
source better.
By around 1910, it was apparent that
machines could be driven with individual elec-
tric motors. This realization had a great impact
on workplace productivity. The apparatus used
in the group-drive system could be abandoned,
so factory construction no longer had to allow
for the heavy shafting and belt housing required
for power transmission. The labor demands of
maintaining that system were also eliminated.
Furthermore, the production process became
more flexible for several reasons: It was no
longer necessary to shut down the entire power
system for maintenance or parts replacement.
Because each machine could be controlled
more accurately, the quantity and quality of out-
put increased. Machines could now be located
and moved about more freely to accommodate
the production process. Last, the workplace
became considerably safer. Figure 10 shows the
diffusion of electric motors in manufacturing.25
Horsepower from electric motors, as a fraction
of the total mechanical drive in manufacturing
establishments, followed a typical S-shaped dif-
fusion pattern. Labor productivity growth in
manufacturing slowed down at the time of elec-
tricity’s introduction.26
In 1890, an astute observer might have
understood the importance of electricity for
lighting homes and powering factories. He
would not, however, have been able to predict
how it would transform lives through the other
inventions it would spawn: radio, television,
and computers.
n 24 While only 3 percent of households used electric lighting in
1899, almost 70 percent did by 1929 (David [1991, table 3]).
n 25 The data source is David (1991, table 3).
n 26 Ibid., table 2.
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The Computerization
of America
As with electrification, the harvest of the IT
revolution has not been immediate. When the
era of computers began in the 1950s, they were
used primarily in academic and industrial re-
search to perform calculations that were im-
practical or impossible to do manually (Jonscher
[1994]). Number-crunching costs declined rap-
idly over this period. Between 1950 and 1980,
the cost per MIP (million instructions per sec-
ond) fell 27–50 percent annually, spurring the
use of computers as calculating devices. In a
feedback loop, widespread adoption led to fur-
ther price reductions as computer manufacturers
rode up their learning curves. In the 1960s,
computers became file-keeping devices used by
businesses to sort, store, process, and retrieve
large volumes of data, thus saving on the labor
involved in information-processing activities.
The cost of storage probably fell at an annual
rate of 25–30 percent from 1960 to 1985. More
recently, computers have evolved into commu-
nication devices, beginning with the advent of
remote accessing and networking in the 1970s.
This allowed a partial liberation of the computer
from the “clean room,” but that umbilical cord
was not completely cut until the 1980s, with the
introduction of the personal computer and the
spread of networking.
IT is likely to streamline corporate structures
significantly by economizing on the number of
workers employed in information collection and
processing. The goal of any firm is simple: Max-
imize profits. To achieve it, the firm’s organiza-
tional structure must be capable of detecting
profit opportunities, directing actions to harvest
them, and monitoring and evaluating returns on
its activities. These activities largely involve han-
dling and processing information. By 1980,
there were 1.13 times as many information
workers as production workers, compared to
just 0.22 in 1900. IT can do much of this infor-
mation collection and processing more effi-
ciently than workers can, eliminating the need
for battalions of clerks, pools of secretaries,
scores of purchasing and sales agents, and lay-
ers of supervisors and administrators. Through
IT, headquarters, design centers, plants, and
purchasing and sales offices can be linked
directly to one another. Over time, such major
changes in business structure will inevitably
raise labor productivity as it becomes possible
to create more output with less labor. Studies
such as Brynjolfsson and Hitt (1993) indicate
that this is happening already.
How realistic is the hypothesis just presented?
To judge this, Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997)
have developed an economic model of the
Information Age, which they simulate on a com-
puter. The model incorporates two ingredients.
First, firms face a learning curve when they
adopt a new technology. Second, firms can
travel up this curve faster by hiring skilled labor.
With the dawning of the Information Age, the
growth rate of labor productivity slumps in the
model economy, and income inequality widens.
The effects of the Information Age gradually
work their way through the system over time. In
the model, productivity growth does not surpass
its old level for about 20 years, and the level of
productivity does not cross its old trend line—
the path it would have traveled had it continued
at its former growth rate—for 40 years. Un-
skilled wages fall in the initial stages of the
Information Age. Twenty years elapse before
this loss in unskilled wages is recovered, and
about 50 go by before unskilled wages cross
their old growth path. Interestingly, during the
early stages of the Information Age, the stock
market booms as it capitalizes the higher rates
of return offered by new investment opportuni-
ties. For many in the economy, waiting for the
benefits of technological miracles will be like
watching the grass grow—but it will grow.
VIII. Conclusion
Plunging prices for new technologies, a surge 
in wage inequality, and a slowdown in the ad-
vance of labor productivity—could these herald
the dawn of another industrial revolution? Just
as the steam engine shook eighteenth-century
England, and electricity rattled nineteenth-
century America, are information technologies
now rocking the twentieth-century economy?
The story told here is simple. Technological
innovation is embodied in the form of new
producer durables or services, whose prices
decline rapidly in periods of high innovation.
Adopting new technologies is costly. Setting up
and operating new technologies often involves
acquiring and processing new information.
Because skill facilitates this adoption process,
times of rapid technological advance should be
associated with a rise in the return to skill. At
the dawn of an industrial revolution, the long-
run advance in labor productivity pauses tem-
porarily as economic agents undertake the
(unmeasured) investment in information
required to get new technologies operating
closer to their full potential.
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How will this affect people’s lives? In the
long run, everybody will gain. Technological
progress, which implies that a unit of labor can
eventually produce more output, makes a unit
of labor more valuable. Given time, this trans-
lates into higher wages and standards of living
for all. Clearly, everybody today is better off
because of Britain’s Industrial Revolution, but
this was not true in 1760. So what about the
short run? Skilled workers will fare better than
unskilled ones, but this disparity will shrink
over time for two reasons. First, as information
technologies mature, the level of skill needed
to work them will decline. Firms will substitute
away from expensive skilled labor toward more
economical unskilled labor. As this happens,
the skill premium will decline. Second, young
workers will tend to migrate away from low-
paying unskilled jobs toward high-paying
skilled ones. This tendency will increase the
supply of skilled labor and reduce the amount
of unskilled labor, easing pressure on the skill
premium. Moreover, the wealthy will do better
than the poor in the short run because the
introduction of new technologies leads to excit-
ing profit opportunities for those with the
wherewithal to invest in them. These profit
opportunities will shrink over time as the pool
of unexploited ideas dries up. On average, the
old have more capital to invest than the young.
Thus, young, unskilled agents will fare worst in
the short run. But in the long run, the rising
tide of technological advance will lift every-
body’s boat. 
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